Book Review: China’s Good War: How World War II is Shaping a New Nationalism by Serrano, Alexandro et al.
History in the Making 
Volume 14 Article 21 
2021 










Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/history-in-the-making 
 Part of the Asian History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Serrano, Alexandro; Mondragon, Brittany; Anton, Jacqulyne R.; and West, Sarah (2021) "Book Review: 
China’s Good War: How World War II is Shaping a New Nationalism," History in the Making: Vol. 14 , Article 
21. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/history-in-the-making/vol14/iss1/21 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the History at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in History in the Making by an authorized editor of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more 






Book Review: China’s Good War: How World 
War II is Shaping a New Nationalism 
 
By Alexander Serrano, Brittany Mondragon, Jacqulyne R. 
Anton, and Sarah West  
 
 
Immediately following World War II, China was plunged into 
devastating internal and external conflicts that lasted until the 
post–Cold War era (1947–1991). This stunted the development of 
(and reckoning with) the collective memory of World War II. This 
conflict was a worldwide phenomenon that affected nearly every 
corner of the globe. However, the collective memory of the war 
and the specific use of that memory varies significantly, sometimes 
conflicting with other domestic and international accounts. 
Following the end of the war in 1945, many of the countries 
involved had time to come to terms with the impacts and effects of 
the war, and the way it was remembered publicly and privately. In 
contrast, the Chinese Civil War (1927–1949) and the Cold War 
stripped China of the ability to accurately absorb the traumas of 
World War II and incorporate it into its national narrative.  
Rana Mitter, one of the leading historians on modern 
China, authored China’s Good War: How World War II is Shaping 
a New Nationalism, a critical text that analyzes the changing 
landscape within Chinese nationalism since 1980. This “new” 
nationalism is attributed to a reinterpretation of World War II by 
the Chinese government in Beijing to further legitimize themselves 
on the current global stage. Mitter’s work contributes a 
groundbreaking history of China’s use of the World War II 
wartime legacy to secure its role in the post–1945 international 
order. Using the framework he calls “circuits of memory,” Mitter 
observes how collective memory about World War II, also known 






shape Chinese identity at a national, regional, and local level.1 
China’s current revisionist efforts to portray itself as a World War 
II hero is an attempt “to exercise regional dominance in Asia, with 
aspiration to a more global reach,” and to prove China is a morally 
righteous nation.2 
Mitter begins with a concise summary of the political 
divide between the Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek (1887–
1975), and the Communists, led by Mao Zedong (1983–1976), 
who reluctantly combined their forces against Japan during World 
War II. In a teleconference call for California State University, San 
Bernardino’s “Modern China Lecture Series” on March 2, 2021, 
Rana Mitter stated that China “was the longest single theater of 
World War II between 1937 and 1945 starting as a silent Japanese 
war but ending up, of course, as part of the Asian theater… more 
than 10 million Chinese civilians and military were killed… [and] 
80 to 100 million Chinese became refugees in their own country.”3 
Following World War II in China, the primary focus turned once 
again to the decimating civil war that lasted from 1927 to 1949.4 
After the Communist victory in 1949, the Chinese Community 
Party (CCP) closely censored and removed any positive 
attributions of the Nationalist’s efforts during World War II. The 
reality that the Chinese wartime victory belonged to the Nationalist 
Party during World War II forced the CCP to reckon with the fact 
that the credit of the wartime victory was not theirs. As Mitter 
acknowledges, the restrictions regarding the Nationalist’s wartime 
role became more inclusive after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976.  
 
1 Rana Mitter, China’s Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New 
Nationalism (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020), 8. 
2 Ibid., 8. 
3 Rana Mitter, “CSUSB Modern China Lecture Series, Rana Mitter, China’s 
Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism,” March 2, 2021, 
CSU San Bernardino, San Bernardino, CA,  YouTube, 1:02:53. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OCaiWfzKs8w&t=725s. 
4 While Republican China (1912–1949) was plagued by internal division 
between the Communists, Nationalists, and collaborationists allied with Japan, 






The beginning chapters examine this new acceptance of 
wartime memory, such as the inclusion of Nationalist soldiers’ 
voices under the Communist regime. The revisions began in 
academia with the ascendancy of Communist leader Deng 
Xiaoping (1904–1997) in 1978. Chinese scholars found themselves 
in a more liberal environment as compared to the previously 
censored and politically charged discourse published under Mao 
Zedong. Under this “relatively unindoctrinated view,” scholars 
began researching previously forbidden areas of research regarding 
World War II such as the Nationalists’ war efforts, Japanese 
collaborationists, and even Chiang Kai-shek himself. Mitter 
illustrates this by comparing works from scholars like Hu Qiaomu 
(1912–1992) and Huang Meizhen, who expanded previous 
narratives of the war. Mitter admits that even today the “writing of 
history and the practice of politics have always been closely 
intertwined in China.”5 
Mitter continues by examining China’s quest to take its 
place alongside the heads of the Western world. In the 1980s, 
China focused on social memory by using the selective curation of 
museums, the censorship of writers, and a patriotic education as 
vehicles to shift the narrative of World War II. Mitter explains how 
these methods aided in creating “a new collective memory of 
World War II as a way to create a morally weighted narrative 
about China’s role in the global order.”6 It was also within these 
parameters that China adopted the already globally held view of 
World War II as the “good war,” highlighting the moral value of 
wartime participation.7 This Chinese revisionist tactic continued to 
 
5 Mitter, 62.  
6 Ibid., 7.  
7 Ibid., 124. The “good war” is a term coined by Studs Terkel in “The Good 
War”: An American Oral History of World War II. His “use of the term was 
layered with irony, since the war had been devastating for so many Americans, 
and the ‘goodness’ of its overall narrative stood in sharp contrast to the Vietnam 
War that had followed just two decades later.” Mitter continues to say, 







be explored, as it was also portrayed in film and through the 
internet. Techno-authoritarianism combined with celebrity culture 
opened up the opportunity to expand this campaign of collective 
memory into the twenty-first century.  
Mitter points out how “Chinese filmmakers have attempted 
to emulate American film to tell a different story” and goes on to 
link several films to this assertion in which there are often famous 
American actors portraying heroes in depictions of wartime 
China.8 Movies such as Flowers of War (2012), directed by Yi-
Mou Zhang, and Unbreakable Spirit (2018), directed by Xiao 
Feng, had the intentional incorporation of American actors in an 
attempt to capitalize on celebrity culture within China, but also to 
garner a global audience for these films to encourage the 
popularity of China’s World War II narrative in the international 
world. Alas, the global audience did not receive these films as 
intended by the filmmakers. Unbreakable Spirit was never released 
in theaters; the film’s release in China was canceled in 2018 and it 
received a straight-to-download release in the United States in 
December of that same year. According to a 2016 Showbiz article, 
“[i]t’s not like a lot of people in the world care about that” which 
explains why the Chinese version of World War II “continues to 
resist globalization.”9 Likewise, Flowers of War “did very badly at 
the US box office,” earning a mere $48,558 during its first release 
week in 2012.10 
Continuing with the theme of wartime memory, Mitter 
dives into the complexities of said memory by comparing wartime 
identity and regional circuits of memory in two different sites: the 
Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing and the Communist 
capital in northern Yan’an. The Nationalist’s “plan for a wartime 
capital to be established was part of a wider set of changes in 
 
ways in which personal experience has come to the fore in explaining the wider 
cultural significance of that and other ears in the Western psyche.”  
8 Mitter, 151.  
9 Ibid., 154.  






China’s political geography, as the Nationalists sought to 
consolidate what was still only partial control of the country.”11 As 
the seat of the wartime government for the Nationalists and their 
leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the CCP forbade 
Chongqing’s residents from properly expressing their memory of 
the war after the collapse of the Nationalist’s control of mainland 
China in 1949. Mitter argues that  
 
During the years of Mao’s rule, the authorities gave 
Chongqing little space to remember or mourn its 
suffering during the war. The cold fact was that the 
narrative of Nationalist resistance provided no 
ideological ballast for the new socialist state.12  
 
Survivors of World War II, China’s civil war, and the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–1976) did not speak of World War II in public, 
but rather in private.13 However, the 1980s saw a revival of the 
collective memory of the Nationalist’s wartime capital. The CCP 
allowed more discussions of the war to occur outside their control 
which enabled the last remaining people of the wartime era to 
officially share their stories. 
A large portion of the book is devoted to the collective 
memory of Yan’an since the Communist Party’s memory has been 
consistently told since the end of the war unlike that of the 
Nationalists, the collaborationists, and the everyday people. 
Nevertheless, Mitter discusses the similarities between the 
Nationalist’s wartime capital and the Communist’s wartime 
capital. Unlike the dominant national narrative, which assumed 
differences between the two, regional memory revealed striking 
similarities. Like that of the Nationalists, the government-
sanctioned memory for the Communist’s wartime capital in 
Northern Yan’an was one of plenty. Official accounts depicted the 
 
11 Mitter, 172.  
12 Ibid., 177. 






abundance of food and fervent patriotism during the war period 
and the numerous devotees of the “Yan’an Way.”14 Additionally, 
the personal wartime memories of those in Yan’an showed the 
similarities of everyday experiences to those in Chongqing. In 
contrast to the government-sanctioned narratives, personal wartime 
memory revealed that hunger was present in both capitals just as it 
was present in Henan from 1942 to 1943 due to the famine. 
Unfortunately for those who experienced the famine during the 
war, “the official reason for the discomfort about the famine is 
harder to define; it seems to result from a combination of a 
depressing story with a little patriotic or nationalistic value, along 
with uncomfortable reminders of the Great Leap Forward Famine 
[1958–1961].”15 
The book concludes by arguing that Beijing, the 
government of China, makes controversial reaches back in time 
towards the Cairo Conference (1943) to justify its present-day 
expansions into the South China Sea. This is controversial because 
the government in China at the time of the Cairo Conference was 
led by the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-Shek, and not the 
Communist Party under Mao Zedong, who came to power only 
after the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Once again, China is using 
“the rehabilitation of the Nationalist’s war record at home” as a 
“justification for its own desire for greater influence.”16 In 2013, 
China referenced the Cairo Conference to validate its territorial 
claims on the uninhabitable Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands 
located in the East China Sea.17 In 2015, the president of the 
People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, used World War II to 
insist that China’s contributions to the Allied victory proved China 
deserved a role in the international order. Therefore, World War II 
 
14 Mitter, 195. “Yan’an Way” refers to the specific practices in Yan’an during 
the 1940s that followed the Communist agenda and were perceived to be 
different from Nationalist Chongqing.  
15 Ibid., 209.  
16 Ibid., 216–217.  






“was being used, in effect, to create new partnerships, while 
bolstering myths about old ones” to justify contemporary issues 
with which China is concerned.18 
Following in line with the historical trend of seeking to be 
“present at the creation” of the post–World War II international 
order, “China is engaging in painstaking detail with the existing 
order so as to recreate it in a recognizable form, but in its own 
terms—to be present at the re-creation” of the contemporary 
international global order.19 Mitter argues that China’s “relatively 
weak claim to ownership of the international postwar order” was 
bolstered unexpectedly in 2016 when then-President Donald J. 
Trump won the presidential election in the United States.20 As the 
leading champion of the international liberal order, the United 
States no longer seemed to seek the leadership of it which allowed 
China an opportunity to “present itself as the savior...in a bid to 
strengthen the historical and rhetorical substance behind its quest 
for international legitimacy.”21 Through the collective memory of 
the war, combining both its military and economic power in the 
region, and a moral position for its claims, China continues to draw 
upon its wartime legacy to claim that its desired dominance in Asia 
is valid.  
The book closes with an observation of the world’s reaction 
and acceptance (or lack thereof) of China’s newfound nationalism 
in its long postwar period. During his March 2021 presentation in 
California State University, San Bernardino’s “Modern China 
Lecture Series,” Rana Mitter stated that,  
 
Collective social memory of the Second World War 
experience in China has shaped in many ways all 
sorts of aspects of China’s public life in the last 40 
years… this is a phenomenon that’s about 
 
18 Mitter, 232.  
19 Ibid., 11.  
20 Ibid., 248. 






propaganda… but it’s so much more than that. Part 
of [the] new nationalism is a marketing ploy and it 
is about China in the last 40 years under the PRC 
[People’s Republic of China] in the Reform Era. 
What changed from the 1980s [is that] for the first 
time in decades they are not talking about a 
nationalistic discourse involving class. They are 
talking about one that involves cross-class alliances 
and also cross-party.22  
 
In a way never seen before, World War II gave China a unifying 
struggle and narrative where before (pre–1945) China was plagued 
by domestic class struggle.  
The global community is currently watching the 
development of China’s new nationalism. Mitter cautions that as 
“China becomes more powerful, the world will have to pay more 
attention to the stories that it wants to tell. Whether we realize it or 
not we are all living in China’s long postwar.”23 As the United 
States starts to re-enter the global order in 2021 as a leading liberal 
power, it will be interesting to see how it affects the development 
of China’s new nationalism predicated on heroism, victimhood, 




22 Rana Mitter, “CSUSB Modern China Lecture Series, Rana Mitter, China’s 
Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism,” March 2, 2021, 
CSU San Bernardino, San Bernardino, CA,  YouTube, 1:02:53. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OCaiWfzKs8w&t=725s. 
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